• C++ Programming for Financial Engineering
    Highly recommended by thousands of MFE students. Covers essential C++ topics with applications to financial engineering. Learn more Join!
    Python for Finance with Intro to Data Science
    Gain practical understanding of Python to read, understand, and write professional Python code for your first day on the job. Learn more Join!
    An Intuition-Based Options Primer for FE
    Ideal for entry level positions interviews and graduate studies, specializing in options trading arbitrage and options valuation models. Learn more Join!

Fear of a Black Swan article

Joined
4/17/08
Messages
1
Points
11
howdy folks,

just wanted to survey the reactions of this community to this article - an interview with Mr. Black Swan, Nassim Taleb:
http://money.cnn.com/2008/03/31/news/economy/gelman_taleb.fortune/index.htm?postversion=2008040305
Fear of a Black Swan

Risk guru Nassim Taleb talks about why Wall Street fails to anticipate disaster.

By Eric Gelman, assistant managing editor
(Fortune Magazine) -- In two bestselling books, "Fooled by Randomness" and "The Black Swan," Nassim Nicholas Taleb has explored the ways people misunderstand randomness and risk. At the heart of his thinking is the idea of a "Black Swan" - an unlikely but not impossible catastrophe that no one ever seems to plan for. In an e-mail and telephone exchange with Fortune's Eric Gelman that began with Taleb in the Yucatán for the equinox, the New York City-based former trader turned scholar and essayist expounds on the role of Black Swans in the current market crisis.
What is a Black Swan?
What I call a Black Swan is a surprise event - like the discovery of the black bird in Australia, which was unpredictable because swans in the Old World were all white. But unlike the bird, my Black Swan carries large consequences.
There are two types of businesses: those that are exposed to Black Swans and those that are relatively insulated from them - not because Black Swans cannot occur, but because their impact is not going to be monstrous. Your dentist's income will not disappear on a single day: No single event will carry big consequences for her. But trading profits can all be lost by a single transaction. So some businesses are insulated, some (like technology) are exposed to positive Black Swans, and others are exposed to negative ones.
Most people seem to have been caught off-guard by the subprime crisis, yet such an event was not only predictable but also inevitable. It was a Black Swan, yes?
The Black Swan is a matter of perspective. A turkey is fed for 1,000 days - every day lulling it more and more into the feeling that the human feeders are acting in its best interest. Except that on the 1,001st day, the butcher shows up and there is a surprise. The surprise is for the turkey, not the butcher. Anyone who knows anything about the history of banking (or remembers the 1982 Latin American debt crisis or the 1990s savings and loan collapse) will tell you that the subprime crisis was so bound to happen. Banks are exposed to such blowups. Bankers have been the turkey, historically.
So I call these crises "gray swans." I've been telling anyone willing to listen that banks have a tendency to sit on time bombs while convincing themselves that they are conservative and nonvolatile.
I gather you don't have a lot of respect for the effectiveness of Wall Street's "risk management."
It is the "science" of risk management that effectively turned everyone involved into a turkey. If the Food and Drug Administration monitored the business of risk management as rigorously as it monitored drugs, many of these "scientists" would be arrested for endangering us. We replaced so much experience and common sense with "models" that work worse than astrology, because they assume that the Black Swan does not exist.
Trying to model something that escapes modelization is the heart of the problem. We like models because they do not require experience and can be taught by a 33-year-old assistant professor. Sometimes you need to say, "No model is better than a faulty model" - like no medicine is better than the advice of an unqualified doctor, and no drug is better than any drug.
The idea that catastrophe can strike without warning does not seem particularly hard to understand. Why doesn't Wall Street ever seem to allow for that possibility? And why doesn't it learn from past catastrophes?
Let me blame business schools and the financial economics establishment - they have a vested interest in promoting models and devaluing common sense.
I worked on Wall Street for close to two decades in trading and risk management of derivatives. I noticed that while portfolio models got worse and worse in tracking reality, their use kept increasing as if nothing was happening. Why? Because in the past 15 years business schools accelerated their teaching of portfolio theory as a replacement for our experiences. It looks like science, and they have been brainwashing more than 100,000 students a year. There is no way my experiences can be transmitted to the next generation because of these schools. We've had fiascoes in finance that they need to neglect because they contradict their models. The problem may also be the Nobel in economics that gave a stamp to these junky theories. Someone needs to make the Nobel committee account for this, for the damage to society - and I hope to do so.
Banks thought they were hedging their bets in the mortgage market. Clearly they were wrong. Would there have been a way to participate in the mortgage bond market in a prudent way?
Of course, in a less leveraged manner. But greed pushes bankers to take the maximum amount of "hidden risks" - those risks that do not show on a regular basis because the models miss it, but end up causing blowups. Banking is a very treacherous business because you don't realize it is risky until it is too late. It is like calm waters that deliver huge storms.
You can tell that there will be another blow-up, another Black Swan, but you can't tell me where it will occur - or can you?
I don't know where it may occur. But if you look at balance sheets and contingent liabilities, it is easy to know who may be exposed to negative ones and who may be exposed to positive ones. Furthermore, some banks and hedge funds are more resistant than others to the Black Swan - we need to discriminate between them.
Is there any way to prevent drastic shocks to the financial system?
Occasional blowups are good if they are small and recurrent. When you live in Manhattan, you notice the quality of the food is high because restaurants are rapidly punished for their mistakes. But unfortunately we have been experiencing the opposite: rare but deep and systemic blowups.
Is there something fundamentally wrong with the structure of the U.S. financial system? What can be done to fix it?
In the past, the financial world had a very diversified ecology: banks going bust on a steady basis. They were not all homogeneous.
Today the entire banking system is dominated by a few monster banks, and almost all have the same exposures. So the system became less and less volatile while becoming riskier and riskier. So we moved from the more resilient ecology to a more concentrated architecture. I used to say, "You trade with a bank, you end up trading with J.P. Morgan (JPM, Fortune 500)." Well, it turned out to be true with the Bear Stearns (BSC, Fortune 500) rescue.
Did your personal portfolio benefit or suffer from the subprime crisis?
I prefer not to answer that, as I am trying to avoid talking about my nonintellectual activities.
 
His comments on "why Wall Street doesn't seem to allow for possibility of catastrophe?" and "fundamental structure of US financial strucuture".....

His "Black Swan" might be there...but we just be too reliant to the models/standard portfolio theories to find it out :)
 
Always a pleasure to read Taleb, a born iconoclast. Yes, in finance no model is usually better than a bad model. So why the ubiquitous use of models? It's the emperor without any clothes. Business schools need to teach something, and profs need to make a living -- so they peddle garbage. Financial and economic models may be garbed in the same attire as the models of physical phenomena -- classical mechanics, quantum mechanics, fluid mechanics, etc. -- but the important distinction is that they don't work, or at best only shed some loose qualitative insight.
 
Bigbadwolf, you certainly have it right. Long experience & long schooling lead me to same belief. Why don't firms build possibility of disaster into models? Because senior execs only want quants to justify how they can use more leverage & take more risk -- to juice short-term profits & their multi-million$ bonuses -- and never have the slightest interest in a realistic model that says "Slow down", or "cut back". They have no interest in the long-run; or correct answers; only take the millions (preferably hundreds of million$) and run! If you say they need to take less risk, they will show you the door, and you will never get another job again. Then you will have to learn how to plant rice & clean toilets. (These will be new college courses.) This is the real purpose of financial engineering.
Larry
 
Bigbadwolf, you certainly have it right. Long experience & long schooling lead me to same belief. Why don't firms build possibility of disaster into models? Because senior execs only want quants to justify how they can use more leverage & take more risk -- to juice short-term profits & their multi-million$ bonuses -- and never have the slightest interest in a realistic model that says "Slow down", or "cut back". They have no interest in the long-run; or correct answers; only take the millions (preferably hundreds of million$) and run! If you say they need to take less risk, they will show you the door, and you will never get another job again. Then you will have to learn how to plant rice & clean toilets. (These will be new college courses.) This is the real purpose of financial engineering.
Larry

I agree with you on the whole but want to add that "realistic models" may not be possible. We can't calibrate and recalibrate economic and financial models by using repeatable and controlled experiments where we control some variables and vary one or two others. That's the gist of the problem. That's what distinguishes sciences such as physics from finance and economics. The use of the same language -- mathematics -- doesn't alter this fact and indeed serves to obfuscate this key distinction in the minds of the lay public who, when observing strings of arcane symbols, imagine that quants and economists have reliable models at their disposal.

If I can recommend yet one more book, it would be Mackenzie's "An Engine, not a Camera: How Financial Models Shape Markets," published by MIT Press. His key contention is that models such as Black-Scholes have created the derivatives market despite the fact that traders don't really subscribe to the assumptions of the B-S model (particularly after 1987), yet continue to use such a model because of its convenience and computability. Indeed, the model has been turned on its head by allowing traders to use B-S to calculate "implied volatility," which is one way of both using B-S and yet not believing in it. The use of Heston is another example of doublethink concerning B-S: the implied volatility surface is constructed by using B-S, yet if we believed in B-S, we wouldn't construct an implied volatility surface to begin with. The point is we have no way of calculating future volatility using past numbers and traders don't even bother trying: B-S is just a useful tool for calculating "implied volatility," which is a handy notion for traders. In short, we have no overarching theories like classical mechanics or Maxwell's electrodynamics but just a number of computationally convenient rules-of-thumb masquerading as theories.
 
Back
Top