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Nicholas Maounis, founder of hedge fund firm Amaranth Advisors LLC, made a decision in April 2005 that eventually cost him his firm.
Brian Hunter, his star natural gas trader, had been offered a $1 million-plus bonus to join Steven Cohen's SAC Capital Advisors LLC. Maounis, who had built his Greenwich, Connecticut-based firm to $6 billion in assets, didn't want the trader to leave. So he named Hunter co-head of the energy desk and gave him control of his own trades, according to former employees who requested anonymity.
Within 17 months, the trader chalked up $6.6 billion in losses, detonating the biggest hedge fund implosion ever. Investors say Maounis gave Hunter, 32, too much latitude and that the trader, managing more than half of the firm's assets, was blinded by a bet that had worked for two years.
"Amaranth's demise is not due to some complicated quantitative reason," says Hendry Higdon, who runs New York-based Higdon Partners LLC, a recruiter for hedge fund firms. "It's about human failing and frailty."
Market conditions weren't ideal in 2005 when Maounis negotiated with Hunter for an enhanced role. Convertible bonds were tumbling, and Amaranth's credit bets were suffering after Standard & Poor's cut the ratings of Ford Motor Co. and General Motors Corp. to junk levels.
Maounis, who often sat on the trading floor, looked to Hunter to rescue the firm because of his successful energy trades. "Do something," former traders quote Maounis as saying when Hunter walked by. "We need you."
Hunter, who liked to wager that the difference between the prices of natural gas in winter months and summer months would widen, obliged. Employees say his big score came in September 2005, when natural gas bets made $1 billion in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Yet investors were concerned that Amaranth, which had about 30 percent of its assets in energy at the end of 2005, wasn't diversified enough. "It looked to us like the Amaranth multi-strategy fund was a pure energy bet," says Edward Vasser, chief investment officer of Wolf Asset Management International LLC, a Santa Fe, New Mexico-based fund of funds. Hunter and Maounis declined to comment.
In 2006, when an abrupt market reversal left the Amaranth fund facing enormous losses, it was too late to unload positions. During one week in September, Hunter's bet on natural gas lost about $4.6 billion.
(C) Bloomberg Markets Magazine Feb'07
Brian Hunter, his star natural gas trader, had been offered a $1 million-plus bonus to join Steven Cohen's SAC Capital Advisors LLC. Maounis, who had built his Greenwich, Connecticut-based firm to $6 billion in assets, didn't want the trader to leave. So he named Hunter co-head of the energy desk and gave him control of his own trades, according to former employees who requested anonymity.
Within 17 months, the trader chalked up $6.6 billion in losses, detonating the biggest hedge fund implosion ever. Investors say Maounis gave Hunter, 32, too much latitude and that the trader, managing more than half of the firm's assets, was blinded by a bet that had worked for two years.
"Amaranth's demise is not due to some complicated quantitative reason," says Hendry Higdon, who runs New York-based Higdon Partners LLC, a recruiter for hedge fund firms. "It's about human failing and frailty."
Market conditions weren't ideal in 2005 when Maounis negotiated with Hunter for an enhanced role. Convertible bonds were tumbling, and Amaranth's credit bets were suffering after Standard & Poor's cut the ratings of Ford Motor Co. and General Motors Corp. to junk levels.
Maounis, who often sat on the trading floor, looked to Hunter to rescue the firm because of his successful energy trades. "Do something," former traders quote Maounis as saying when Hunter walked by. "We need you."
Hunter, who liked to wager that the difference between the prices of natural gas in winter months and summer months would widen, obliged. Employees say his big score came in September 2005, when natural gas bets made $1 billion in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Yet investors were concerned that Amaranth, which had about 30 percent of its assets in energy at the end of 2005, wasn't diversified enough. "It looked to us like the Amaranth multi-strategy fund was a pure energy bet," says Edward Vasser, chief investment officer of Wolf Asset Management International LLC, a Santa Fe, New Mexico-based fund of funds. Hunter and Maounis declined to comment.
In 2006, when an abrupt market reversal left the Amaranth fund facing enormous losses, it was too late to unload positions. During one week in September, Hunter's bet on natural gas lost about $4.6 billion.
(C) Bloomberg Markets Magazine Feb'07