To people working in Risk Management

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Did you read Nassim Taleb's books? Do you agree with him?

A short synopsis as I understand his message: Relying on historical data and failing to incorporate future black swan events, the methods your bank uses (VaR etc.) are bogus. He even goes so far calling advocates of using these methods charlatans.

I just wonder what the other side has to say about this..
 
Does he propose a better idea?
I think he doesn't believe banking as it is currently run is a viable business in the long run. According to him the banksector lost more money in the last crisis then they made in the profitable decades before together. So he proposes not using different risk models, but a different business model altogether (as far as I understood).
 
I think he doesn't believe banking as it is currently run is a viable business in the long run. According to him the banksector lost more money in the last crisis then they made in the profitable decades before together. So he proposes not using different risk models, but a different business model altogether (as far as I understood).
And what was the "different business model" that he proposed?
 
And what was the "different business model" that he proposed?
That's a good question. I think he proposes something like not taking any deals that leads you to be exposed to open ended risks. But then counterparties would have nowhere to go to hedge their risks..
 
That's a good question. I think he proposes something like not taking any deals that leads you to be exposed to open ended risks. But then counterparties would have nowhere to go to hedge their risks..
What type of investment couldn't possibly be argued to have at least some "open-ended risk?"

Because of a government default being a potential "unforeseen black swan event" I'm sure he'd even call someone a "charlatan" for claiming Treasuries have no credit risk.
 
Problem is that by their very nature black swan risks cannot be calculated, often cannot even be anticipated. In a sense he's right that we're now in terra incognita, and extrapolations from the past may be poor indicators with regard to what will happen in the future. But not clear there is any other tool.
 
What type of investment couldn't possibly be argued to have at least some "open-ended risk?"

Because of a government default being a potential "unforeseen black swan event" I'm sure he'd even call someone a "charlatan" for claiming Treasuries have no credit risk.

There is a difference between investing in government bonds and losing all of your investment, versus leveraging to the hilt (apparently safe based on some calculations) and losing more than you own (and possibly needing a bailout if you're big enough).
 
There is a difference between investing in government bonds and losing all of your investment, versus leveraging to the hilt (apparently safe based on some calculations) and losing more than you own (and possibly needing a bailout if you're big enough).

OK, but how would you even determine how much leveraging is "safe" (as opposed to what you call "leveraging to the hilt") without using some sort of model that would have to be parameterized with at least some historical data (and that would also somehow miraculously take into account black swans)?

Or should the use of all leverage just be completely banned because Nassim Taleb thinks risk modeling is bullcrap?...
 
There is a difference between investing in government bonds and losing all of your investment, versus leveraging to the hilt (apparently safe based on some calculations) and losing more than you own (and possibly needing a bailout if you're big enough).
And I wouldn't exactly just shrug off the impact of a US government bond default... if the US gov't defaulted, all hell would break loose in literally every financial market on the planet. ;)
 
OK, but how would you even determine how much leveraging is "safe" (as opposed to what you call "leveraging to the hilt") without using some sort of model that would have to be parameterized with at least some historical data (and that would also somehow miraculously take into account black swans)?

Or should the use of all leverage just be completely banned because Nassim Taleb thinks risk modeling is bullcrap?...

I might be wrong, but I think that's what he is actually advocating for institutions too big to fail.

edit: (since according to him there are no good models, as black swans can't be predicted)
 
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And I wouldn't exactly just shrug off the impact of a US government bond default... if the US gov't defaulted, all hell would break loose in literally every financial market on the planet.

So far has only happened to countries whose bonds have been denominated in a currency other than their own -- e.g., Mexico, Argentina, and Russia in USD.
 
So far has only happened to countries whose bonds have been denominated in a currency other than their own -- e.g., Mexico, Argentina, and Russia in USD.
I'm not an "Austrian Economics" nut ;)... I wasn't trying to claim that US bond default was at all likely anytime soon... it's what one might call a "black swan event," though, so it's something Taleb would probably nonetheless trash someone for if they tried to claim was 100% impossible
 
there are known knowns, known unknowns, unknown knowns and unknown unknowns about any situation. the first three situations, by definition, provide us with 'something' that helps us to understand the risk in that situation. risk measures are constructed to evaluate the chance, size and other characteristics of the risk. then we know, if the risk does occur, what penalty and loss we face. the human mind hates uncertainty.

the fourth situation provides us with no knowledge to work with.. in this (fourth) situation, we do not understand what the risk is or what the consequence of the risk is, nor when it will occur, or other characteristics. by following the same path as before (constructing risk measures, assessing size of risk, etc), we are in an even worse position than that of doing nothing, because we are lying to ourselves and others around us. this is 'charlatanism'. we do not understand the risk and our lying to ourselves by saying that we do.

people in risk management will not really understand what i wrote above. why? because they will tell you 'well... what else do you propose?'. this style of thinking is pathetic, because that person's mind does not understand what 'unknown unknown' means and still thinks that situation can be explained - hence they ask for an alternative solution. these savants never ask themselves if the solution even exists, in the first place. the best risk managers or best risk blah blah won't be found churning away numbers in spreadsheets or creating models, they are people who, as Taleb and others put it, have 'skin in the game' and don't spend time saying "well if you think the Value at Risk model is shit, what do you propose?". instead, they assess risk themselves, build a belief about how to assess risks and take actions. they face consequences and learn from them.

there are other reasons as to why Taleb has issues with risk management and calls it bullshit, leaving alone the sole aspect of Value at Risk and other models. to truly understand something, one should always look into the roots into how that thing came to existence (never look at the tree, look at the root, etc)

imagine an experienced and wise antiques dealer who knows his business. he knows that he has some risks that he can understand others that come from no where. he has suffered the consequences of a risk occurring to him and has learned. he will have an intuition about when a risk is likely - through his own mechanisms. this is called knowledge. now imagine, that the sale of all antiques becomes regulated and the regulator tells our friend (the dealer) that all of his deals must pass a 'risk measure'. our friend doesn't know what a risk measure is, but he does know his business. over time, he forgets his business and learns the risk measure. this change of knowledge is problematic -> years of market mechanisms suddenly get lost.

using the example above, one can see how value at risk and other risk models succeed in 'destroying' knowledge, not 'creating' knowledge. Taleb and other traders point this out in one form or another.

Taleb barks on about stable processes (Levy processes, say), which have thicker tails and put a higher likelihood on "one off" events occurring. of course he is not unique to appreciate stable processes -> they have been studied for a long time and have many desirable properties. but the antique dealer doesn't give a shit about stable processes, the risk manager doesn't know what the Levy-Ito decomposition theorem is, and the directors don't even know what the numbers mean. so it is pointless. too big to fail. the best advice? stick to simple models, understand the limitations of VaR and ensure that regulators have power to punish those who are morons.
 
Did you read Nassim Taleb's books? Do you agree with him?

A short synopsis as I understand his message: Relying on historical data and failing to incorporate future black swan events, the methods your bank uses (VaR etc.) are bogus. He even goes so far calling advocates of using these methods charlatans.

I just wonder what the other side has to say about this..

What does your plumber do when you explain the methods he uses to unclog your toilet are unsound, not thoroughly tested in scientific laboratory conditions, and rather ad-hoc?

Or wait, do you just stand aside and let him do his job?
 
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